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Abstract: This article  traces the formation of Africa's position in view of the negotiations with the 
European Union for a successor to the Cotonou Agreement set to expire in February 2020, 
providing some explanations for the failure of the ACP Group and the African Union to achieve a 
consolidated position. By examining official discourses and the role of different actors, it 
demonstrates that the ACP Group and the AU manifested alternative views on the EU-ACP 
cooperation model and on the part that each wished to play in the negotiation and implementation 
of the future agreement. Moreover, it shows how, in spite of previous frictions, the ACP 
Secretariat and ACP Committee of Ambassadors on the one hand and the AU Commission and the 
AU Permanent Representatives Committee on the other hand formed two separate common fronts 
to defend their territories and preserve (or increase) their role as the EU's legitimate 
interlocutors. 
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Introduction 
On 30 May 2018, the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) Group of States adopted a 
negotiating mandate for the successor to the Cotonou Agreement, which has governed its 
relations with the European Union (EU) since June 2000.1 This document proposed to 
maintain the integrity of the ACP Group and contained a series of guiding principles for the 
upcoming negotiations, but failed to take account of the intensification of regional integration 
dynamics and the increased prominence of regional organisations. This choice was 
contentious, not least because, on 19 March 2018, the African Union (AU) had adopted a 
decision indicating its intention to use the post-Cotonou process to conclude a completely new 
framework for cooperation with the EU on a Union-to-Union, continent-to-continent basis, 
'outside the ACP context'.2 The AU's pronouncement, which was also divisive, did not attract 
much public attention – probably because on the same day the African Continental Free Trade 
2 
 
Area (AfCFTA) was signed by 44 countries – but generated apprehension in diplomatic 
circles in Brussels. 
This article asks why the ACP Group, which includes 48 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (as 
well as 16 in the Caribbean and 15 in the Pacific), and the African Union, which consists of 
all countries in Africa including the 48 members of the ACP Group, took two positions that 
seemed difficult to reconcile. To explain this conundrum, it examines official discourses and 
unravels the role played by the key organs of the two organisations. In particular, it traces the 
process in both contexts through analysis of published and unpublished documents and 
drawing on semi-structured interviews with 18 senior policy makers of the ACP Secretariat, 
the African Union Commission, and several African ambassadors between March and May 
2018. Ultimately, it demonstrates that the ACP Group and the AU projected alternative views 
on the EU-ACP cooperation model (and, consequently, on the nature of their partnership with 
the EU) and on the part that they wished to play in the negotiation and implementation of the 
future agreement. Moreover, it shows how, in spite of previous frictions, the ACP Secretariat 
and ACP Committee of Ambassadors (CoA), on the one hand, and the AU Commission 
(AUC) and the AU Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC), on the other hand, formed 
two separate common fronts to defend their territories and preserve (or increase) their role as 
the EU's legitimate interlocutors in the attempt to best represent the interests of Africa's 
people. Before delving into the two processes, Africa's variegated relations with the EU are 
sketched and the EU's negotiating directives for a post-Cotonou Agreement briefly presented.  
 
Africa's relations with the European Union 
Africa engages with Europe in a number of different configurations, ranging from bilateral to 
continental through regional and ad-hoc formats. 
Bilateral relations mostly concern conventional matters like development cooperation, 
economic development, and political dialogue. The main legal framework is the Cotonou 
Agreement, an association agreement that governs relations between the European Union and 
79 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. South Africa is a full 
member of the ACP Group but a qualified member of the Cotonou Agreement, as its relations 
with the EU are also regulated by a separate Trade, Development and Co-operation 
Agreement (TDCA) signed in 2004 and the Strategic Partnership signed in 2007.3 Countries 
in North Africa interact with the EU mostly in the context of the European Neighbourhood 
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Policy (ENP), having signed bilateral association agreements (AAs) in the mid-2000s. The 
logic underpinning these three arrangements is different: historically, generous aid packages 
and preferential trade regimes have characterised the EU-ACP partnership; promotion of 
shared interests and cooperation on regional and global issues are at the heart of EU-South 
Africa relations; security, investment opportunities and cultural dialogue are promoted 
through the AAs.  
A second important track refers to the continent-to-continent dimension developed over the 
years via a series of summits that include countries both north and south of the Sahara. This 
process started in Cairo in April 2000 and culminated in the adoption of the Joint-Africa EU 
Partnership (JAES) in Lisbon in December 2007, with subsequent implementation plans 
agreed upon every three years. The launch of the JAES was saluted as a step towards more 
symmetrical relations and an implicit recognition of the increased prominence of the African 
Union. These high expectations, however, were met only in part: policy dialogue intensified 
with the creation of new, yet often cumbersome, institutional frameworks, and with a large 
number of meetings and technical activities often seen as indication of success. An exception 
to this unsatisfactory state of affairs is the partnership on peace and security, which has been 
supported through the African Peace Facility (APF). Paradoxically, the implementation of the 
JAES, and particularly the APF, has relied on resources drawn from the European 
Development Fund (EDF), which is an extra-budget instrument created to support only ACP 
countries and regions.4 
Other formats for Africa's engagement with the EU involve the regional level. In particular, 
various regional economic communities (REC) have, more or less formal, relations with the 
EU, characterised by the EU influencing these organisations through the provision of funds 
and capacity building – particularly in the area of peace and security. In some instances, the 
RECs coincide with the regions that have negotiated and signed the economic partnership 
agreements (EPA), which means that trade relations, for the most part, are no longer covered 
under the EU-ACP framework – nor does trade cooperation with the EU fall within the remit 
of the AU, though with the signing of the AfCFTA some changes may be expected in the 
future. Interestingly, the 1975 Georgetown Agreement, which marked the birth of the ACP 
Group, created four regions in Africa: Central Africa, West Africa, East Africa, and Southern 
Africa.5 Ad-hoc interaction between European and African actors takes place on security-
related issues, for instance in the case of the G5 Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, 
Mauritania, and Niger), and in the area of migration, with policy dialogues with countries 
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along the western migratory route (Rabat Process) and the eastern migratory route (Khartoum 
Process), as well as in the context of the 2015 Valletta Summit with a selected number of 
European and African countries.6 
The expiration of the Cotonou Agreement in February 2020 – together with the fact that the 
JAES was in need of a comprehensive review to take account of the numerous changes that 
had occurred on both continents since 2007 – provided an opportunity to address overlaps 
between all these policy and legal frameworks and rethink relations between the EU and 
Africa more generally. If the performance of the JAES was disappointing at best, the 
existence and added value of the ACP Group was questioned by many, certainly owing to 
changing regionalisation dynamics but also to the patchy implementation record of the 
Cotonou Agreement in the areas of economic development and political dialogue.7  
Taking all of these factors into account, the European Commission, following an intense 
preparatory process,8 proposed to build on the strengths of its long-standing cooperation with 
ACP countries, while allowing for a more regionally tailored approach. More specifically, its 
plan was to conclude a single agreement, but articulated into an 'umbrella' with all ACP 
countries and three regional ‘compacts’. The umbrella would list shared principles, spell out 
strategic objectives and establish mechanisms to facilitate cooperation in international 
settings. The three regional compacts would become the new centre of gravity for action, with 
region-specific priorities and governance mechanisms. With a view to promoting an 'Africa as 
one' approach, the possibility of opening the revised EU-ACP Agreement to 'the involvement 
or adhesion' of countries in North Africa was also foreseen. Notably, the expectation was that 
the three regional compacts would 'replace and upgrade' the existing regional strategies with 
Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, thus including the JAES.9 This vision – endorsed in the 
negotiating directives adopted by the EU Council of Ministers in June 2018 – had an impact 
on how the ACP Group as well as the AU were preparing for the upcoming negotiations.  
 
Tracing Africa's preparations for a post-Cotonou cooperation framework 
The preparations for the post-Cotonou Agreement led by the ACP Group were intertwined 
with a broader discussion on EU-Africa relations launched by the AU. Importantly, the 1975 
Georgetown Agreement entrusted the ACP Group and its organs to exclusively manage the 
EU-ACP partnership. The Cotonou Agreement does recognise the importance of regional 
integration, but it was only with the 2010 revision that the AU was officially included among 
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the actors of cooperation. However, this acknowledgement did not result in a more active 
participation of the AU in the governance of the EU-ACP partnership. By contrast, the AU 
has been the EU's key interlocutor in the five EU-Africa summits held since 2000 – renamed 
AU-EU Summit on the occasion of the fifth one held in Abidjan in November 2017 following 
Morocco's (re-)accession to the AU in January 2017 – as well as in the implementation of the 
JAES. When the possibility that the JAES could be subsumed under a revised EU-ACP 
Agreement emerged, the AU and its organs sought a more direct involvement in the post-
Cotonou discussions, seen as an opportunity to push forward the AU integration plans, 
particularly after the adoption of their long term strategic vision for the next 50 years, known 
as Agenda 2063.10 
 
The ACP negotiating mandate: from Malabo to Lomé 
The ACP started its reflection on the post-Cotonou framework with the establishment of the 
‘Ambassadorial Working Group on Future Perspectives’ in November 2010, which was 
chaired by Guyana’s Ambassador Patrick Gomes, appointed Secretary General of the ACP 
Group in December 2014 for a five-year term.11 The report of the Ambassadorial Group 
called for the repositioning and transformation of the ACP Group, including the possibility of 
acting as a hub of South-South and triangular cooperation, and the creation of structured 
relations with the RECs and other regional organisations; it also urged ACP countries to 
ensure the financial sustainability of the ACP Group so as to reduce its dependence on the EU 
and to agree on measures to strengthen the role of the ACP Secretariat and the Committee of 
Ambassadors.12 In parallel, an ‘Eminent Persons Group’, chaired by former President of 
Nigeria Olusegun Obasanjo, invited the ACP Group to capitalise on its status as a tri-
continental organisation by playing a more visible role in the international arena and to 
remain united with a view to crafting a more balanced partnership post-2020 with the EU. It 
also concluded that, to be considered a relevant and influential player on the international 
stage, the ACP Group should streamline its tasks and concentrate where it has an added value. 
In this regard, it proposed a focus on three key areas: trade and investment, political dialogue 
and advocacy, and development cooperation.13 
Two milestones in the preparation of the ACP negotiating mandate were the ACP summits 
held in Equatorial Guinea in December 2012 and in Papua New Guinea in May-June 2016. At 
the 2012 Summit in Malabo, the ACP Heads of State and Government adopted the Sipopo 
Declaration, through which they reaffirmed their 'determination to stay united as a Group' and 
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committed to 'deepening and enhancing the ACP-EU relationship ... through a new and 
mutually beneficial partnership agreement after 2020'. Moreover, in light of 'the demands for 
fundamental renewal and transformation' seen as 'unavoidable imperatives for strategic 
change', they stressed the importance of a strong ACP Group, certainly in relation to the EU, 
but also in view of 'developing diversified South-South and other partnerships'.14 At the 2016 
Summit in Port Moresby, the ACP Heads of State and Government adopted the Waigani 
Communiqué, through which they expressed their determination to 'reposition the ACP Group' 
so as to ensure that it 'plays a more influential role in global governance with a view to 
fulfilling the legitimate aspirations of our peoples'. Moreover, they reiterated their intention to 
'renew and enhance the ACP-EU partnership with a legally binding agreement building on the 
Cotonou acquis'.15 
The core principles and the framework to guide the negotiations with the EU were 
subsequently outlined by the ACP Council of Ministers and Committee of Ambassadors. The 
ACP Council of Ministers of November 2016 took some crucial decisions on the process and 
the proposed content of the future EU-ACP Agreement. It identified three strategic pillars – 
trade, investment, industrialisation and services; development cooperation, technology, 
science and innovation/research; political dialogue and advocacy – and tasked the CoA to 
commence work on the structure and arrangements for the future negotiations.16 The CoA, in 
turn, produced a position paper, Towards the ACP we want, which spelt out specific priorities 
within each of the three strategic pillars, but failed to clarify the role of regional and 
continental bodies, the intention being that of preserving the existing ACP geographical 
structure based on six regions, four of which are in Africa.17 This position paper was endorsed 
by the ACP Council of Ministers of May 2017, which also defined the guiding principles for 
the negotiations: negotiating as one block, preserving the single undertaking approach, 
securing a legally binding agreement, and maintaining the acquis of the Cotonou 
Agreement.18 In response to the negotiating directives proposed by the European 
Commission, the ACP Council of Ministers of December 2017 invited the CoA to 'engage 
with regional and continental organisations to take account of regional specificities in the 
negotiation process'.19 
The ACP negotiating mandate was officially adopted by the ACP Council of Ministers in 
Lomé at the end of May 2018.20 It confirmed the three strategic pillars and the guiding 
principles for the negotiations as previously agreed upon, adding also a long list of cross-
cutting themes (capacity building; vulnerability and resilience-building, oceans and seas; 
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climate change; gender equality; health; youth and demographic dividend; culture and 
development; peace, security and democracy). It placed significant emphasis on the existence 
of the European Development Fund, or the creation of a new multiannual financial 
mechanism, with adequate resources available to all ACP states, including middle-income 
countries (MICs), and on the preservation of intra-ACP cooperation, thus guaranteeing a 
significant role for both the CoA and the ACP Secretariat. Finally, it reaffirmed that the EU 
and its member states on the one hand and the ACP states on the other hand should be the sole 
parties to the agreement, though it conceded that 'consideration may be given to other actors 
playing a significant role in implementation of the new Agreement'.21  
 
The AU and the African Common Position 
The discussion of the post-Cotonou framework in the AU context commenced with a seminar 
organised by the AU Commission in Addis Ababa in December 2015. In that context, the 
AUC called on the AU to develop a position by 2017 at the latest deciding on whether: the 
Cotonou Agreement, which excludes countries in North Africa, fits the AU's ambitions 
enshrined in Agenda 2063; the EU-ACP framework is still relevant for organising cooperation 
with the EU beyond donor-recipient dynamics; the JAES and the EU-ACP Agreement are 
complementary or alternative frameworks; the ACP Group is the most appropriate platform to 
promote Africa’s interests.22 Clearly, the tone of these requests gives a sense of the sceptical 
approach of the AUC towards the EU-ACP framework as well as regarding the relevance of 
the ACP Group.  
A preliminary discussion on the post-Cotonou process took place at the AU Executive 
Council of January 2017, as part of a general evaluation of Africa's strategic partnerships with 
various international actors (namely, Arab countries, China, India, Korea, Japan, South 
American countries, and Turkey). The AU Executive Council mandated the PRC – in 
collaboration with the AUC, relevant AU Organs, the RECs and African experts and working 
closely with the African Group of Ambassadors in Brussels – to prepare an African common 
position before the July 2017 AU Summit.23 Not much progress must have been made if the 
AU Executive Council of July 2017 reiterated the same request to the PRC, now with a new 
deadline: the AU-EU Summit of November 2017. Some clashes on the possible consequences 
of the post-Cotonou process, however, started to emerge, particularly with countries in North 
Africa, which is reflected in the inclusion of the following clause: 'bearing in mind the 
obligations that some Member States have with the EU' 24 – note that, as mentioned above, the 
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EU had manifested its intention to 'involve' North African countries in a future agreement 
with ACP countries.25 
Surprisingly, the post-Cotonou process did not figure on the agenda of the November 2017 
EU-AU Summit in Abidjan. The European Commission, facing significant  resistance from 
some EU Member States, was finalising its proposal, foreseeing three regional ‘compacts’ 
(one of which was with Africa) complemented by an 'umbrella' for all ACP countries. 
Similarly, the AU was not yet ready to spell out its position. Evidently, both parties seemed to 
have 'a strong priority to avoid controversy at all cost in the Abidjan summit'.26 This choice, 
however, was more puzzling for the AU, particularly because the ACP Group meanwhile had 
made significant progress in articulating its vision (leaving little space, if any, to the AU). 
Some observers have noted that, 'because of a lack of strategic vision, and problems of 
internal cohesion and capacity, the African regional bodies seem[ed] to “submit” themselves 
to an ACP-EU "umbrella" in a partnership of the past that lacks legitimacy, credibility and 
effectiveness'.27 Meanwhile, an AU Executive Council of October 2017 had decided to set up 
a 'Taskforce on Post 2020 Cotonou Agreement', with the aim of speeding up the completion 
of the African common position before the January 2018 AU Summit. The AU Taskforce was 
confronted with ‘various logistical problems’ and, more importantly, with diverging views on 
the substance of the decision, which resulted in further postponement: the AU Executive 
Council of January 2018, once again, invited  the PRC to accelerate work and submit a draft 
text within two months.28 
The African common position was adopted on 19 March 2018 in the context of an 
extraordinary session of the AU Executive Council.29 Even though all attention was on the 
adoption of the momentous African Continental Free Trade Area, the agenda was 'broadened 
to include this issue because of its relevance and the urgent need for the African side to have 
its negotiating tool, like the European Union, the Caribbean and the Pacific, which are already 
up to date in their position', as the Chairperson of the AUC Moussa Faki Mahamat put it.30 
The content of the decision was brief but clear: first, Africa is united and eager to speak with 
one voice; second, the new cooperation agreement with the EU should be a continent-to-
continent partnership with the AU and Agenda 2063 at its heart and should be separated from 
the ACP context; third, all existing arrangements between states or regions of the AU and the 
EU should be preserved; fourth, new agreements underpinned by South-South dynamics 
should be initiated with countries in the Caribbean and the Pacific. In terms of thematic 
priorities, the African common position did not substantially differ from the ACP negotiating 
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mandate: structural transformation of economies and inclusive growth; people-centred 
development; migration and mobility; peace and security; science, technology and innovation; 
environment and climate change; governance, human rights and natural resource 
management. Importantly, the AU Executive Council entrusted the PRC, with the assistance 
of the AUC, to oversee the negotiation process with the EU and regularly report to the AU 
Executive Council itself. 
The adoption of the African common position was celebrated as 'the first step towards a win-
win discussion with the European Union',31 but it was far from being consensual. The process 
was led by pro-AU states such as Rwanda, Chad and, to a degree, South Africa, which 
together with the AU Commission vociferously questioned the added value of the ACP 
Group. Significant resistance, conversely, came from most countries in West Africa, 
particularly Senegal and Burkina Faso, as well as many in East Africa, such as Uganda and 
Kenya, which held a more positive view of the EU-ACP partnership; in between, countries in 
North Africa were wary of the potential implications of the AU decision for their privileged 
relations with the EU, but were reassured by the inclusion into the final text of a clause 
pointing to the preservation of their existing arrangements with the EU.32 These divisions 
were reflected in the unusual language used: the AU Executive Council did adopt the African 
common position, nevertheless it allowed regions to send comments so that the AU Taskforce 
could finalise it in view of an official presentation at the ACP Council of Ministers in Lomé at 
the end of May 2018.33  
Following the circulation of a revised version in mid-May 2018, the general lines of the 
African common position were presented in Lomé, but only in the context of a side-event 
organised for all regional organisations. The AU, not being a member of the ACP Group, was 
denied the floor at the ACP Council of Ministers meeting, which in fact adopted a mandate 
for a renewed EU-ACP partnership agreement, this time with unlimited duration, thus 
ignoring the African common position adopted in Kigali only two months earlier.34  
 
The ACP, the AU and Africa's relations with the EU 
The analysis of the processes that led to the adoption of the ACP negotiating mandate and the 
AU’s African common position, as discussed in the previous section, has pointed to the 
existence of two camps: those, within the ACP Group, who wish to preserve the EU-ACP 
cooperation model, and those, within AU circles, who believe that the AU is Africa's only 
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legitimate interlocutor with the EU. This section, by examining official discourses and the 
role played by key actors, seeks to provide some keys to explaining the divide between the 
ACP Group and the AU, which albeit led by two more or less active secretariats, largely 
overlap in terms of membership: the same 48 African countries belong to both the ACP Group 
and the AU. 
 
Diverging discourses 
The first contentious issue, in terms of official discourses, concerns the achievements of the 
EU-ACP cooperation framework. Within the ACP Group, the verdict is overwhelmingly 
positive, ranging from characterising the relationship 'as a unique North-South Development 
Cooperation model' (2012 Sipopo Declaration)35 to recognising 'the effective contribution that 
the long-standing partnership with the European Union has made to the development of ACP 
States' (2016 Waigani Communiqué);36 from stating that the 'special historical relationship 
remains today unequalled in its nature and scope' (2017 ACP position paper)37 to 
acknowledging the need to 'maintain and build on the acquis of the Cotonou Agreement' 
(2018 ACP negotiating mandate).38  
Within AU circles, a more critical view has been advanced, portraying the EU-ACP 
partnership as a traditional North-South, donor-recipient cooperation framework, 'which has 
not made a real difference in practice'.39 In this vein, a senior policymaker within the AUC 
has claimed that the Cotonou Agreement has done little to 'enable Africa to position itself 
firmly on the path to strong and inclusive growth and sustainable development' and may even 
have aggravated the situation for some countries, 'plunging an important part of African 
peoples into extreme poverty'.40  
The second point of divergence between the two camps relates to the status of the EU-AU 
partnership. Within the ACP Group, opinions appear somehow fluid: some wish 'to see the 
African Union-European Union partnership consolidated in the frame of a new post-Cotonou 
Agreement', which would continue being driven by member states;41 others have cautioned 
against the supranational ambitions of the AU and its capacity to effectively lead towards 
(what should become) a mature continent-to-continent relationship.42 Interestingly, the 2017 
ACP position paper warned about the potential overlaps between the EU-ACP and other 
policy frameworks, pointing to 'the importance of applying scrupulously the principle of 
subsidiarity',43 whereas the 2018 ACP negotiating mandate listed the promotion of regional 
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integration as one of the strategic objectives to pursue, whilst  'maintaining the geographical 
and geopolitical character of the ACP Group'.44  
Within AU circles, the possibility that the JAES could be subsumed under the EU-ACP 
framework, as per the proposal of the European Union, generated some preoccupation in a 
few African capitals.45 In their view, the EU-ACP Agreement has contributed to fragmenting 
Africa, weakening and slowing down the pace of the integration process, and more generally 
undermining its political, social and economic interests.46 Thus, as put by the AUC's 
Department for Economic Affairs, 'it does not make sense to accommodate existing pan-
African and regional dynamics under an ACP umbrella framework. Rather would it be 
desirable to reverse this logic by starting from the regional dynamics in Africa'.47 It is 
therefore not surprising that the JAES is seen as a genuine political partnership breaking 
donor-recipient dynamics, based on the respect of African unity and the promotion of 
continent-to-continent dialogue. The negotiations of the post-Cotonou Agreement, in this 
logic, could provide a crucial opportunity to inject the continental dimension into the bilateral 
relations between the EU and African countries.48  
The third divide is in relation to who would best articulate and defend Africa's interests in the 
negotiations with the EU. Within the ACP Group, the shared view is that the ACP 
membership 'has secured benefits for the countries in their international engagement in 
specific areas that are more favourable than the outcomes they could have expected from 
purely national action or via regional or other configurations of states'.49 The key strength of 
the ACP Group, historically, has been that of representing a block resting on solidarity 
between its members – though it should be noted that in the negotiation of the Cotonou 
Agreement it managed to use 'numbers as leverage' only to a minimal degree. The risks of 
potentially asymmetrical negotiations in the post-Cotonou process have not been overlooked: 
for instance, the 2017 ACP position paper indicated that 'The challenge for the ACP Group 
would be to ensure that there is not simply an imposition by the EU of its vision'50, whereas 
the 2018 ACP negotiating mandate cautioned against 'the institutional asymmetry between the 
ACP Group and the EU in order to ensure appropriate levels of representation and 
authority'.51  
Within AU circles, the EU-ACP partnership has been perceived as mainly an aid-delivery 
mechanism with no political traction. By contrast, the AU is deemed not only to have more 
political clout and legitimacy, but also to provide a better structure to have Africa's voice 
heard and respected, 'to compel Europe to fulfil its obligations and to steer the dialogue with 
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Europe in Africa's favour'.52 This standpoint is certainly the consequence of the various 
proposals launched by the AU since the mid-2010s, notably to reform the institutional 
architecture with the Kagame report, to ensure financial stability based on a proposal of 
Donald Kaberuka and, mostly important, to achieve stability and prosperity following the 
adoption of Agenda 2063 and other key initiatives such as the African Continental Free Trade 
Area.  
 The fourth clash is linked to the role of the ACP Group and the AU in the international arena. 
The ambition of the ACP Group, particularly in the early phases of the process, was that of 
eventually becoming the leading global actor operating on behalf of the developing world, 
especially in light of the decreasing relevance of the G77; there was 'a clear-cut imperative for 
the ACP Group to make the transition from its role of being mainly an interest aggregating 
body – primarily in regard to relations with the European Union – to one of active global 
leadership and engagement on the many issues that face the developing countries of Africa, 
the Caribbean, and the Pacific at the regional and global levels', as the 2017 ACP position 
paper put it.53 Eventually, these ambitions were narrowed down and the official discourse 
started focusing mostly on the ACP Group’s partnership with the EU, particularly the benefits 
of joining forces in the international arena at a time in which multilateralism has been under 
attack.  
Within AU circles, naturally, only the AU is deemed legitimate to conclude an agreement 
'based on values, interests and aspirations that unite us and actively participate together in 
global discussions'.54 In this regard, the change of name from EU-Africa Summit to EU-AU 
Summit at the November 2017 meeting of the heads of state and government of the two 
continents is noteworthy: in fact, it reflects 'the increasing recognition of the AU as an 
international actor that is becoming difficult to circumvent when engaging Africa'.55 As for 
the aspiration of the ACP Group to be a global actor, the prevailing line within the AU is that 
'the ACP Group can in no way represent a relevant policy framework for addressing global 
and regional governance, peace and security, and migration issues'. 56 
 
Clashing institutional interests 
The ACP negotiating mandate and the AU's African common position were significantly 
affected by the role that different actors wished to play in the negotiation and, eventually, 
implementation of a future agreement with the EU. On the one hand, the ACP Group 
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(specifically the ACP Secretariat and in part the Committee of Ambassadors) has claimed that 
it is the only actor legally entitled to engage with the EU. On the other hand, the AU 
(particularly the AUC and in part the PRC) has seen itself as the sole legitimate actor capable 
of representing Africa as a continent. 
As for the ACP Group, the Committee of Ambassadors has performed two main tasks: 
assisting the ACP Council of Ministers in its functions and monitoring the implementation of 
the EU-ACP Agreement. More recently, however, it has gained prominence, taking almost all 
decisions before being formally adopted by the ACP Council of Ministers – though it should 
be noted that only a relatively small group of ambassadors is active. Meeting on a weekly 
basis, it takes decisions by consensus, which significantly constrains its ability to be an 
effective and goal-oriented actor; moreover, it often reaches lowest common denominator 
outcomes as most ambassadors tend to protect the interests of their home countries.57 
The ACP Secretariat is tasked to serve the organs of the ACP Group, but more recently it has 
acquired new functions linked to the direct management of large amounts of intra-ACP 
resources, which has attracted criticism for its excessive dependence on EU institutions.58 It is 
headed by a secretary general (SG), elected according to a principle of rotation among the six 
ACP regions. Historically, the position of the SG in the ACP governance structure has been 
marginal, so much so that Obadiah Mailafia, head of cabinet under SG Mohamed Ibn 
Chambas (2010-12), has claimed that 'the status of the Secretary-General is, in truth, more 
that of Secretary than General'.59 Nevertheless, some SGs, in particular Patrick Gomes (2015-
2020), have been able 'to carve out a space for autonomous action, partly by using their 
privileged access to information, networks and resources.'60 
Within the AU, the Permanent Representatives Committee, which is composed of 
ambassadors representing their country of origin, plays a crucial role in the preparation and 
implementation of the decisions of the Executive Council and participates in the 
implementation of the programme of activities of the AU. Its role and performance have been 
subject to criticism, owing in part to human resources challenges (ie, scarce staff 
specialisation, delayed circulation of documents), lack of transparency and ineffective use of 
funds, and excessive interference in AUC affairs.61 The PRC was criticised in the Kagame 
report for taking 'an unwarranted role in the decision-making process', delaying decisions 
agreed upon by the AU Assembly or even disregarding them and interfering too much in the 
running of the AUC.62 Some analysts have noted that most African ambassadors to the AU 
behave 'like overbearing potentates in their dealing with the AU once they are in Addis 
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Ababa, simply because their national governments do not exercise sufficient day-to-day 
administrative oversights as they should'.63  
The AU Commission, appointed by the AU Assembly, acts as the custodian of the AU's 
Constitutive Act, is tasked with the day-to-day management of the AU, and implements the 
decisions taken by other organs of the AU. Its role and performance, like in the case of the 
PRC, have created divisions. Some have accused it of organisational inefficiency and failing 
to provide strategic direction to the AU. The reluctance of AU member states to further 
empower it ultimately means that they still see it as no more than a facilitator of cooperation – 
in this regard, the deliberation of the 2012 AU Summit to reverse its decision of 2009 to 
transform the AU Commission into the AU Authority was a setback to any aspiration of 
supranationalism.64 Others have argued that the AUC has increasingly ensured that Africa's 
voice gains space in international debates and that Africa's common positions are articulated 
and given space in international contexts.65  
In the process that led to the adoption of the ACP negotiating mandate, the CoA and the SG 
formed a common front in promoting and protecting the ACP Group from external threats – 
with few exceptions within the group of African ambassadors.66 The CoA prepared two 
substantial reports, the first in 2014 and the second in 2017, which to a large extent formed 
the basis for the ACP negotiating mandate: these reports, as to be expected, called for a 
significant increase in the roles of the CoA and the ACP Secretariat, in terms of both 
competences and resources. The ACP Secretariat, especially SG Gomes, conducted various 
outreach missions to publicise the 'common position that the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
countries, as a unified entity, shall engage the European Union Member States and the 
European Commission in a single undertaking' for a successor to the Cotonou Agreement, and 
that no separate negotiation processes should be foreseen.67  
On the preparation of the AU decision, the AUC and the PRC cooperated more than was 
expected, considering their previous frictions and allegations of undue interference. In a 
speech made before the PRC when he presented the African common position in March 2018, 
Moussa Faki Mahamat praised the 'indispensable role of the PRC' and referred to the benefits 
of the interface between the AUC and the AU member states: 'It is this constant back and 
forth movement between the PRC, the Member States and the Commission that contributes to 
building a shared perception and understanding of geopolitical and economic issues by these 
three main actors at the service of one and the same cause: the emergence of Africa and the 
affirmation of its geopolitical personality'.68 Evidently, the AUC and the PRC sought to use 
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the post-Cotonou process to regain legitimacy in the AU system of governance, defend their 
territory from the proposal to subsume the JAES into a future EU-ACP Agreement, and gain 
more power by playing a more prominent role in the management of any future EU-Africa 
Partnership, whatever form that would take. Their view is that, since all African countries that 
are party to the EU-ACP Agreement are also members of the AU, then negotiators speaking 
on behalf of Africa should receive the mandate from the governing bodies of the AU, as the 
ACP Group is not accountable to any of the AU’s organs.69 The caustic conclusion reached by 
René N’Guettia Kouassi, AUC Director of Economic Affairs, therefore is not surprising: 
'there is every reason to believe that the debate on the subject is being “held hostage” in 
Brussels while the AU institutions, including the PRC and the AU Commission in particular 
are excluded from the negotiations'.70  
 
Conclusion 
This article has sought to deliver on two key goals. First, it has traced the formation of 
Africa's position in view of the negotiations for a successor to the Cotonou Agreement set to 
expire in February 2020. On the one hand, African ambassadors sitting on the ACP 
Committee of Ambassadors and African ministers sitting on the ACP Council of Ministers 
contributed to the ACP negotiating mandate adopted in Lomé in May 2018. On the other 
hand, African ambassadors sitting on the AU's Permanent Representatives Committee and 
African ministers sitting on the AU Executive Council contributed to the African common 
position adopted by the AU in Kigali in March 2018. Interestingly, the ACP negotiating 
mandate and the AU’s African common position are at odds, not so much in terms of the 
objectives to pursue, but essentially on who would best be able to represent the collective 
interest of African states vis-à-vis the EU. The former called for a stronger role for the ACP 
Group and a renewal of the EU-ACP Agreement, using mostly legal arguments – the 1975 
Georgetown Agreement entrusted the ACP Group exclusively to manage the EU-ACP 
Agreement. The latter, using political arguments, sees the African Union as the only 
legitimate actor to interact with the EU on behalf of Africa and calls for the adoption of a new 
cooperation agreement, which respects African unity. 
Second, this article has provided some explanations for the failure of the ACP Group in 
Brussels and the AU in Addis Ababa to achieve a consolidated position and for sending 
confusing messages that could ultimately weaken the position of Africa in the negotiations 
with the European Union. While it may be expected that the ACP Secretariat on the one hand 
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and the AU Commission on the other hand would seek to promote their (bureaucratic) 
interests, less understandable is the fact that ambassadors of the same African countries – 
sitting on the CoA in Brussels or the PRC in Addis Ababa – support processes leading to 
alternative outcomes. Clearly, coordination must not have worked well in national capitals, if 
ministerial representatives of African governments meeting in the ACP context (in most cases 
finance ministers) and ministerial representatives of the same governments meeting in the AU 
context (generally foreign affairs ministers) also agreed upon two decisions that were difficult 
to reconcile. These findings pave the way for further research on Africa’s international 
relations, certainly on Africa’s collective agency vis-à-vis other actors, but also on the 
formation of foreign policy preferences of single African states.   
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